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THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BUSINESS ANGEL 
MARKET: EVIDENCE FROM SCOTLAND 
 
 
ABSTRACT.  
 
Business angel investing – a key source of finance for entrepreneurial businesses – is 
evolving from a fragmented and largely anonymous activity dominated by individuals 
investing on their own to one that is increasingly characterised by groups of investors 
investing together through managed angel syndicates. The implications of this change have 
been largely ignored by scholars. Based on research in Scotland, which has experienced a 
particularly rapid growth in angel groups, the paper examines the following issues: the 
drivers of this change, the characteristics of the groups; their investment activity and 
outcomes; the investment process of angel groups; and the characteristics and role of group 
‘gatekeepers’.  The paper concludes with an assessment of the impact of this growth of angel  
groups on the economy and considers the implications for other regions and countries. 
 
Key words: entrepreneurial finance, business angels, angel groups, angel syndicates, regional 
development 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is widely accepted that business growth should be based on equity rather than debt finance 
In practice, the funding for each stage in company growth is typically associated with a 
particular source. Businesses initially get started on the basis of the personal finances of the 
founder/founding team (including the owner’s ‘sweat’ equity) and their family and friends 
(the “3Fs”), and then access business angels, venture capital, development capital and 
ultimately public markets in order to finance their growth. This has typically been 
conceptualised as a funding escalator. Although this model can be criticised for being over-
simplistic it is nevertheless the case that, at least in the US, a significant proportion of firms 
which raised venture capital had previously raised finance from business angels (Freear and 
Wetzel, 1990; Madill et al, 2005) while 52 firms (8%) achieving a NASDAQ listing between 
2001 and 2007 had previously raised funding from both business angels and venture capital 
funds (Johnson and Sohl, 2012). However, this funding escalator no longer functions 
effectively. Changes in the supply of institutional finance which have been observed for at 
least the past thirty years (Bygrave and Timmons, 1992; Gompers and Lerner, 2001; Mason, 
2009a) have involved a shift from classic venture capital, which specialises in investing new 
capital in young growing companies (Bhidé, 2008; Lerner et al 2012), in favour of private 
equity which invests in established companies to buy out their existing owners and 
restructure their activities with the intention of making them more efficient. One of the 
consequences has been that business angel-funded businesses are less likely to be able to 
raise follow-on funding from venture capital funds, thereby compromising the so-called 
‘relay race’ of financing a growing business “in which angel investment runs the critical first 
leg of the race, passing the baton to [the] venture capital [fund] only after the company has 
begun to find its stride”  (Benjamin and Margulis, 1996:71). There has also been a decline in 
the number of IPO listings in the post-bubble era (since 2001), notably  amongst smaller 
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companies (Mason, 2011). This is attributed to a variety of factors: an array of regulatory 
changes designed to advance low cost trading, which unintentionally removed the value 
components that are required to support the market, and smaller caps in particular, such as 
quality sell side research, capital commitment and sale (Weild and Kim, 2009; 2010); lack of 
investor interest in small caps; and the preference of venture capital funds to exit via a trade 
sale rather than an IPO (Bessler and Seim, 2011). 
 
Given the geographical concentration of private sources of venture capital in core regions 
(Mason and Harrison 2002a; Zook 2004; Mason, 2007) the funding escalator is at its most 
dysfunctional in peripheral regions, where public sector-backed venture capital funds have 
sought to fill this gap (Murray, 1998; Mason and Pierrakis, 2013) but with limited 
effectiveness (Murray, 1998; 2007; Nightingale, et al, 2009; Lerner, 2009). As a result, 
business angels are now playing an increasingly important role in financing new and young 
businesses, as well as supporting them through their hands-on involvement.   
 
The importance of business angels in supporting the development of a dynamic 
entrepreneurial economy has been recognised by both national and regional governments in 
various countries. Angel investment activity is encouraged in a variety of ways, notably 
through tax incentives and support for business angel networks and other types of 
intermediary which ‘introduce’ angels and entrepreneurs seeking finance to one another 
(Mason, 2009; OECD, 2011). This has brought business angel investing into the realm of 
economic development, giving government a legitimate interest in what would otherwise be a 
private activity. The different objectives of investors and economic development agencies 
creates a potential source of tension, an issue that we revisit in the conclusion. 
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The starting point for this paper is that this key source of entrepreneurial finance -– business 
angel investment – is changing from an atomistic, fragmented and largely invisible market 
comprising almost entirely individuals investing on their own or in ad hoc small groups to 
one that is increasingly characterised by highly visible angel groups and syndicates which 
consolidate and channel finance from individual investors to entrepreneurial ventures.  The 
implications of this evolution of the angel market have been largely ignored by scholars. The 
consequence is that our understanding of the operation of the market remains based on 
studies of individual angels – which is now only part of the overall angel market - and does 
not provide insights into the operation and investment activity of angel groups. This paper is 
the first to explicitly and systematically examine this transformation of the angel market, 
building on previous papers of the overall evolution of the early stage risk capital market 
(Harrison et al 2010), the evolution of specific business angel syndicates (Sudek 2006; 
Gregson et al 2013), and the emergence of the angel group gatekeeper as a new actor in the 
market (Paul and Whittam 2010). Based on a case study of Scotland, where this market 
evolution has proceeded the furthest, the paper addresses the following key issues: first, what 
are the implications of the growth of angel groups for the financing of entrepreneurial 
ventures, second, to what extent does this render redundant our existing understanding of the 
investment process which is derived from studies based on individual investors, and third, 
what is the contribution of angel investing to economic development? 
 
THE CHANGING ANGEL MARKET 
Business angels are high net worth individuals who invest their own money, either alone or 
with others, directly in unquoted businesses in which there is no family connection. They 
normally invest in the form of equity finance in the hope of achieving a significant financial 
return through some form of exit (although this is rarely planned when the investment is 
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made). Typically they will also take an active involvement in their investee businesses 
(Mason, 2006). Business angels are particularly important from a regional economic 
development perspective because the majority of their investments are local (Harrison et al, 
2010b; Avdeitchikova, 2010), hence they are typically recycling and reinvesting locally-
created wealth. Given the geographical concentration of venture capital investing in core 
regions (Mason, 2007: Mason and Pierrakis, 2013) business angels are particularly important 
in peripheral regions.  
 
In the 1980s and 1990s angels operated anonymously, investing for the most part on their 
own or with small groups of friends and business associates in ventures that they came across 
through personal social and business networks. Not surprisingly, the angel market operated 
inefficiently, with both investors and entrepreneurs incurring high search costs in identifying 
one another, and often giving up as a result (Wetzel, 1986). It was very much an ad hoc 
activity for most investors and levels of professionalism were correspondingly low (Blair, 
1996). Meanwhile, entrepreneurs typically did not understand how to make themselves 
‘investment ready’ (Mason and Harrison, 2000; 2001). An early market intervention, 
pioneered in the USA (Wetzel, 1984; Wetzel and Freear, 1996) and Canada (Blatt and 
Riding, 1996) but subsequently adopted in Europe, was the creation of business angel 
networks – essentially introduction services – which provided a communication channel to 
enable entrepreneurs to get their investment proposal to the attention of potential investors 
and for angels to examine investment opportunities without compromising their privacy 
(Mason and Harrison, 1996a). Subsequently some of these networks also delivered 
investment readiness programmes (Mason and Kwok, 2010) and angel training (San José et 
al, 2005). The difficulties in developing a commercially viable model for this service has 
meant that most networks have relied on government funding, and several in the UK have 
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closed after losing this support. Those which operate commercially levy a fee on the 
investments that they facilitate. This business model requires a focus on larger deals (Mason 
and Harrison, 2000). Evidence on the effectiveness of networks is mixed but broadly positive  
(Mason and Harrison, 1996c; Mason and Harrison, 1999; 2002c; Collewaert et al, 2010). 
 
The angel market began to transform in the late-1990s as angels started to organise 
themselves into groups to invest collectively. This trend has proceeded furthest in the USA. 
The Band of Angels, which was founded in Silicon Valley in 1995, is generally regarded as 
the first organised syndicate to be formed. Others, such as Tech Coast Angels (1997), Sierra 
Angels (1997), Common Angels (1997) and The Dinner Club (1999), soon followed (Preston 
2007). Between 1996 and 2006 the number of identifiable business angel organisations in the 
US grew from 10 to over 250 (Preston 2007).  The Angel Capital Association, covering the 
USA and Canada, was created in 2003 for the purposes of transferring best practice, lobbying 
and data collection. It now comprises 187 formal angel groups, plus some affiliate members 
(http://www.angelcapitalassociation.org/directory/). There is growing evidence of 
specialisation by industry sector (e.g. health care angel syndicates) and type of investor (e.g. 
women-only angel syndicates). In Europe, there has been a similar expansion in the angel 
market but, with the exception of Scotland (Harrison et al 2010; Gregson et al 2013) – which 
is the focus for this paper - it has evolved differently, favouring angel networks which 
provide mechanisms connecting angels with entrepreneurs seeking finance (Mason, 2009b). 
In the case of Scotland, the number of identifiable syndicates has grown from 2 to over 20 
between 2000 and 2012, the most radical shift in market organisation of any region in 
Europe. Moreover, Archangels was founded in 1992, and so is older than its better known US 
counterparts. Indeed, if Scotland was a US state it would be the 11
th
 largest in terms of angel 
group investment activity (Grahame, personal communication) whereas it ranks only 29
th
 in 
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terms of GDP per capita. Angel groups have also emerged in several other countries, notably 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand (OECD 2011). However, with the exception of a handful 
of case studies (May and Simmons, 2001; May, 2002; Cerullo and Sommer, 2002; Payne and 
Mccarty, 2002; May and O’Halloran, 2003; Sudek, 2006) and some general discussion 
(Mason, 2006; Sohl, 2007; 2012; Gregson et al 2013) scholars have been slow to react to this 
organisational transformation of the angel market.  
 
Angel syndicates have emerged for two main reasons. First, business angels have difficulties 
of investing alongside venture capital funds because of the investment instruments which 
VCs use, notably, liquidation preferences, anti-dilution rights, special subscription rights and 
enhanced follow-on rights.  This became apparent during the dot.com crash of the early 
2000s. At this time many of the companies that had been financed in the ‘bubble’ of the late 
1990s were running out of cash. The huge fall in valuations in the crash meant that venture 
capitalists had to write down the value of many of the investments that they had already 
made. The consequence was that those companies that did raise further funding were 
refinanced at lower prices. As the initial investors in these businesses, angels were 
particularly vulnerable in these, so-called, down-rounds. Unable, or unwilling, to provide new 
cash their investments were typically wiped out. This resulted in angels losing trust in venture 
capitalists and since then many have sought to avoid investing in deals that are likely to 
require follow-on funding from venture capitalists, leading to a growing segmentation in the 
early stage risk capital market (Harrison et al, 2010a)   A further difficulty is that business 
angels and venture capital funds have different objectives. This is particularly clear at the exit 
stage where, as Peters (2009) has noted, venture capital funds will refuse to exit at a valuation 
that is perfectly acceptable to angel investors but is below their ‘hurdle rate’ because it would 
affect their ability to raise a new fund. Second, the decline in the venture capital industry 
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since the dot.com crash has meant that opportunities for angels to pass on their investments to 
venture capital funds for follow-on funding are much more restricted, necessitating angels to 
make follow-on investments themselves.  
 
These development have prompted individual angels to recognise the advantages of working 
together, notably in terms of better deal flow, superior evaluation and due diligence of 
investment opportunities, as well as social attractions. Moreover, by grouping together they 
can aggregate their investment capacity and so have the ability to make bigger investments 
and follow-on investments, with the potential to take businesses to an exit themselves without 
the need for follow-on funding from venture capital funds. The ability for angel groups to 
achieve ‘early exits’ (Peters, 2009) have been enhanced  by a fundamental change in ‘start up 
economics’. It costs considerably less to start a technology business now compared with ten 
years ago or longer as a consequence of such developments as cloud-based software, web and 
social media and e-commerce platforms. When combined with lean start-up techniques to 
provide capital efficiency (Blank, 2005; Reiss, 2011) companies can start with little or no 
capital and sustain a low burn rate for some time before needing to raise external finance. 
This has meant that it has become more feasible for angels to finance businesses to the point 
where it achieves commercial feasibility, particularly in ITC sectors without the need for 
venture capital funding. However, businesses that are not sold at this point will require  
further funding to grow the business and secure customers. 
 
Angel groups are distinctive from BANs. Table 1 highlights the differences and describes the 
standard design of a group. However, in practice they take various forms. The key difference 
is whether the person appointed to be the external face of the group and manage the  
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Table 1. Business Angel Groups vs. Business Angel Networks 
 
Business Angel Group 
Angel groups in the US (and in some other 
countries) are primarily focused on recruiting 
members and managing deal flow for those 
members.  Education, social engagement, pitch 
coaching entrepreneurs and other activities may 
also be important functions. 
(1)   Members are recruited to join the group, 
appealing to accredited investors with the deal 
flow and best practices offered by the 
network.  Members are often required to sign rules 
of membership agreement stipulating their 
expected engagement (meeting attendance, 
participating in due diligence, annual investment 
numbers, etc.) and committing neither to “steal 
deals” nor to solicit entrepreneurs for consulting or 
members of business. 
(2)   Entrepreneurs are solicited to pitch to the 
group, through websites and other networking 
activities in the community.   A small group of 
members or staff pre-screen deals for presentation 
to the members.  Investor-readiness training is 
seldom provided by US angel groups. 
(3)   Once an entrepreneur has pitched to the 
members, a due diligence committee of members 
(and perhaps staff) is initiated, representing the 
group.  The deal lead negotiates a single term sheet 
for the round of investment with the 
entrepreneur.   Once the term sheet and due 
diligence are complete, the deal is offered to all 
members of the group for investment.  In some 
cases, very popular deals may offer a limited 
investment amount or time, on a first come, first 
served basis.  Members are investing for their own 
accounts, consequently members can invest larger 
or smaller sums, or pass on a deal. 
There are several models for managing angel 
groups, including both member management and 
manager management.  The angel group does not 
make investments or recommend investments to 
members, rather members make their own 
decisions based on the shared due diligence and 
term sheets. 
Business Angel Network (BAN) 
In general, BANs seem to have two primary 
focuses: 
(1)   Soliciting a large mailing list of potential angel 
investor members (and others, such as service 
providers) and organizing pitching meetings for 
them.    Members have limited obligations to the 
group, that is, small or no annual dues, no duty to 
invest as part of the group (versus pocketing deals 
for themselves), no participation requirements 
(attendance, due diligence), no leadership mandate 
and no minimum investment expectations. 
(2)   Engaging with the entrepreneurial community, 
sometimes by providing investor-ready services 
and pitch coaching, with a focus, for the most 
qualified entrepreneurs, on inviting them to 
pitching events. 
After the pitching session, the entrepreneurs and 
investors are left to their own devices to do a 
deal.  There is no organized group deal processing; 
instead each angel engages with the entrepreneur, 
finds co-investors (within or outside the BAN), 
completes due diligence, negotiates a term sheet 
and closes the deal. 
There appear to be two models for the BAN 
operational platform:  (a) a not-for-profit model, 
often driven by economic development agencies 
and (b) a for-profit model pursued by experienced 
investors and funded by success fees and tolls 
charged to entrepreneurs and investors. 
 
 
Source: Bill Payne: http://gust.com/angel-investing/startup-blogs/2013/04/05/angel-groups-
business-angel-networks/  
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investment process -  often termed the ‘gatekeeper’ (Paul and Whittam, 2010) - is one of the 
group members or a professional employed by the group. Some of the larger and longer 
established US groups have established sidecar funds – that is, committed sources of capital 
that invest alongside the angel group. The investors in such funds are normally the syndicate 
members but may also include other high net worth individuals (HNWIs) or institutions. 
These funds give the syndicate additional capital to invest in deals to avoid dilution, enable 
syndicate members to achieve greater diversification by exposing them to more investments 
than they can make directly through the syndicate, and is a means of attracting ‘right-minded’ 
investors who want to participate in seed and early stage deals but cannot be active members 
of a syndicate. 
 
The emergence of angel syndicates is of enormous significance for the development and 
maintenance of an entrepreneurial economy. First, they reduce sources of inefficiency in the 
angel market. The angel market has traditionally been characterised by inefficiency on 
account of the fragmented and invisible nature of angels. There was no mechanism for angels 
to receive a steady flow of investment opportunities. Angel syndicates, in contrast, are 
generally visible and are therefore easier for entrepreneurs to approach, thereby reducing the 
search costs of both entrepreneurs and angels and increasing deal flow. A further source of 
inefficiency was that each investment made by an investor has typically been a one-off that 
was screened, evaluated and negotiated separately. However, the volume of investments that 
angel syndicates make enables them to develop efficient routines for handling investment 
enquiries, screening opportunities and making investment agreements. The increased number 
of investors scrutinising potential risks also improves due diligence. 
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Second, they have stimulated the supply-side of the market. Syndicates offer considerable 
attractions for high net worth individuals (HNWIs) who would not otherwise invest in 
emerging companies, for example, because they lack the time, referral sources, investment 
skills or the ability to add value. However, angel groups are also attractive to many existing 
solo angels because of the reduction in risk that arises from investing as part of a syndicate, 
notably the ability to spread their investments more widely and thereby achieve greater 
diversification, and by access to group skills and knowledge to evaluate investment 
opportunities and provide more effective post-investment support. Other attractions of 
syndicates are that they enable individual angels to invest in particular opportunities that they 
could never have invested in as individuals, offer the opportunity to learn from more 
experienced investors and provide opportunities for camaraderie and networking with like-
minded individuals. Thus, angel syndicates are able to attract and mobilise funds that might 
otherwise have been invested elsewhere (e.g. property, stock market, collecting: Mason and 
Harrison, 2000), thereby increasing the supply of early stage venture capital, and to invest it 
more efficiently and effectively.  
 
Third, angel groups are helping to fill the ‘new’ equity gap. The diminished number of 
venture capital funds have consistently raised their minimum size of investment and are 
increasingly abandoning the early stage market, either to invest in larger and later stage deals 
or simply because they have been unable to raise new funds from institutional investors. 
Angel syndicates are now increasingly the only source of funding for new and emerging 
businesses seeking investments in the range £250,000 to £1 million (under $1m in the USA: 
Sohl, 2012). Moreover, as a consequence of their greater financial resources angel groups 
have the ability to provide follow-on funding. This overcomes one of the potential problems 
of raising money from individual business angels, namely that they often lack the financial 
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capacity to provide follow-on funding. Consequently, the entrepreneur is often forced to 
embark on a further search for finance. Moreover, in the event that the need for additional 
finance is urgent then both the entrepreneur and the solo angel will find themselves in a weak 
negotiating position with potential new investors, resulting in a dilution in their investments 
and the imposition of harsh terms and conditions. With the withdrawal of many venture 
capital funds from the small end of the market individual angels and their investee businesses 
have increasingly been faced with the problem of the absence of follow-on investors. Because 
angel syndicates generally have greater financial firepower than individual angels or ad hoc 
angel groups to be able to provide follow-on financing, it more efficient for the entrepreneur 
who avoids the need to start the search for finance anew each time a new round of funding is 
required. 
 
Fourth, the ability of angel groups to add value to their investments should be much greater. 
The range of business expertise that is found amongst angel syndicate members – described 
by May and Simmons (2001: 156), leading angel syndicate practitioners in the USA, as a 
“smorgasbord of advice and strategic services” - means that in most circumstances they are 
able to contribute much greater value-added to investee businesses than an individual 
business angel, or even most early stage venture capital funds. Finally, angel groups are the 
most frequent partners in public sector co-investment schemes (Mason, 2009b; Harrison et al, 
2010a), acting as the focal point for the leveraging of additional funds into the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem. 
 
However, others are less sanguine about the emergence of angel groups. For example, Sohl 
(2012: 37) has suggested that “as angels are becoming more organised they are morphing into 
a portrait of venture capital funds and are losing some of the valuable characteristics of the 
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angel investor …”1 This, in turn, raises two specific concerns (Sohl, 2007; 2012). First, the 
emergence of angel groups will result in a reallocation of angel capital away from smaller, 
seed investing to bigger and later stage deals. Second, angel groups will simply attract 
“inexperienced wealthy individuals seeking a passive investment” rather than active angels 
who can contribute value added to their investee businesses (Sohl, 2007: 360). But whether 
these developments are inevitable remains contested. Others have expressed concerns about 
the cost raising finance, and specifically the practice of angel groups requiring entrepreneurs 
to ‘pay to pitch’ (Entrevestor.com, 2013) and taking fees in the form of a proportion of any 
funds that they raise. 
 
DATA SOURCES AND ANALYSIS 
The study is based on two sources: aggregate data on investment activity, which provides the 
basis for the next section, and interviews with angel group gatekeepers which is the key 
source for the following two sections. Quantitative information on angel investment activity 
is derived from LINC Scotland and the most recent Scottish Risk Capital Market Report 
published by Scottish Enterprise (Harris and Mason, 2012). LINC Scotland provided 
information on aggregate investment activity complied on the basis of data provided by its 
members. The Scottish Risk Capital Market Report is based on an examination of Companies 
House 88(2) returns for all companies that were known to have raised equity finance in the 
period 2009-2011. These returns give the date and number of new shares issued, in most 
cases the price, but not the names of the investors which had to be identified from other 
                                                          
1
 This is illustrated by a recent report from the Boston Business Journal (15 April 2013), headlined “Common 
Angels eyes larger new fund, as group seeks to act more like a VC” which describes how Common Angels, a 
group of about 50 angels in the Boston area is in  discussions to raise a pooled fund which will exceed its 
existing $13m fund. The new fund would make a similar number of investments but would invest more capital 
into each business. The report also notes that it has centralised it decision-making in an eight member 
committee. The report concludes that the end result of these changes is that “Common Angels is now 
operating more like a VC firm ...” 
(http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/blog/startups/2013/04/commonangels-fund-venture-capital-
boston.html?page=2)  
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sources (see Mason and Harrison, 2008 and Harrison et al, 2010a for further discussion of 
this source). 
 
This is complemented by information from 22 semi-structured interviews with gatekeepers of 
19 groups, 18 of which invest in Scotland.
2
 In three groups the gatekeeper role was shared by 
two individuals. In each case both individuals were interviewed. The groups that were 
interviewed included all 17 that are publicly listed on LINC Scotland’s web site. Three other 
groups are also members of LINC Scotland but prefer anonymity. These groups were also 
invited to participate, via LINC Scotland, but declined to do so. Two additional groups were 
interviewed. One was a UK-wide group with a very active Scottish branch but has no 
association with LINC. The other group is a Scottish Co-investment Fund partner that also 
has no association with LINC. The Scottish Risk Capital Market Report (Harris and Mason, 
2012) identified 24 angel groups. However, the groups not included in this study either no 
longer exist or are private offices of high net worth families whose investments and 
operations are much closer to venture capital investing than angel investing. So, although the 
study could be criticized for being LINC-centric it would appear that we have captured most 
of the participants in the market. 
 
Securing the participation of such a high proportion of angel groups in the Scottish market 
was a considerable achievement. In many cases the initial response was not positive and 
follow-up approaches were required. As a consequence, the recruitment process took three 
months.  It started with an initial email to the gatekeeper to request an interview. In several 
cases it was not possible to identify the gatekeeper, but in these cases the recipient of the 
email forwarded it to the relevant individual. 
                                                          
2
 Halo, which is based in Northern Ireland, is also a member of LINC Scotland 
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Of the 22 interviewees, 20 were face-to-face and two were conducted on the telephone. All 
agreed for the interview to be recorded for later transcribing. The interviews ranged in length 
from 37 to 93 minutes, with the average being about one hour. The face-to-face interviews 
took place at a location of the interviewee convenience. Venues included the group’s office, 
coffee shops and the researcher’s office. We agreed with participants that information on 
individual groups would not be disclosed and that findings would be aggregated. Any 
references to specific groups are therefore based on information that is in the public domain 
(e.g. media, presentations). 
 
One of the main challenges of qualitative methods, such as interviews, is how to analyse the 
information that is collected. Several sections of the interviews were based on objective and 
measurable questions, such as the amount invested, number of deals, and age of the 
syndicate. However, other parts of the questionnaire, notably on the skills that a gatekeeper 
requires and their own learning in the role, were based on opinion and perceptions. This 
information has been examined by thematic analysis (Howitt and Cramer, 2007) which is one 
of the most frequently used methods of qualitative analysis for “identifying, analyzing and 
reporting patterns within data” (Braun and Clarke (2006, p. 79). Boyatzis (1998) describes 
the technique as a process of ‘encoding qualitative information’. This process consists of six 
steps (Braun and Clarke, 2006). In the first step the researcher becomes familiarized with the 
data. This was relatively straight forward since one of the authors was actively involved in 
the interviews. The second step involves the creation of an initial set of codes to capture the 
key content of the interviews. The third step consists of searching for themes based on the 
previously developed codes. In the fourth stage the researcher reviews the themes and test 
theme against the original data. The fifth step requires the researcher to define and name the 
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themes. By doing so, the researcher is identifying the “core” of what each theme captures. 
This requires accuracy and precision. The last step involves the write-up of the thematic 
analysis. The process is iterative with the researcher being able to revisit previous steps to 
refine and confirm the analysis. 
 
ANGEL GROUPS IN SCOTLAND: GROWTH AND INVESTMENT ACTIVITY 
The paper is based on Scotland. This is a particularly appropriate context in which to 
undertake this study. Scotland has experienced a rapid growth in the number of angel groups. 
The initial groups – Archangels and Braveheart – were established in the 1990s. In 2002  
LINC Scotland’s membership comprised 300 solo angels and just these two syndicates  with 
about 70 angel members between them. Ten years later (2012) a total of 24 groups have been 
created, although some subsequently either closed or amalgamated. LINC Scotland currently 
has 19 groups in membership, which it estimates comprise about 700 investors in total. There 
are a small number of other groups that are not members of LINC Scotland. Individual 
membership of LINC Scotland is now below 100. Of the 18 Scottish-based angel groups 
interviewed for this study, nearly one-third (six, or 30%) were three years old or less, 
underlining the recent growth in the formation of syndicates. Collectively they had just over 
1,000 members, although this will include some double counting of investors who are 
members of more than one group. Two groups have significant numbers of non-Scottish 
based members. Membership ranges from less than 10 to over 100. Reflecting the skewed 
nature of the visible market observed previously (Mason and Harrison, 2010; 2011), the five 
groups with more than 100 members account for 70% of the total (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1 – Size Distribution of Angel Syndicate membership (source: LINC Scotland) 
 
Two key drivers in the Scottish environment have resulted in this significant increase in angel 
syndicate groups. First, LINC Scotland was created
3
 in 1992 as part of the Scottish Business 
Birth Rate Strategy as a conventional business angel network, responsible for both the 
demand and supply sides of the market and seeking to make ‘introductions’ between 
investors and entrepreneurs that would lead to investments. Some ten years later Scottish 
Enterprise, took increasing responsibility for the demand side, leaving LINC Scotland with an 
agreed remit to develop the supply side of the market. It took the strategic decision, 
influenced by the early successes of Braveheart and Archangels, that this was most 
effectively achieved through the development of angel syndicates. Scottish Enterprise co-
                                                          
3
 It was actually created out of an existing organisation operated by Glasgow Opportunities to give it a pan-
Scotland focus. 
4 
5 
3 3 
1 1 1 
10 20 50 100 150 200 More
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funds certain activities with LINC but does not provide core funding. LINC’s main sources of 
funding come from ERDF
4
 and the private sector. 
 
LINC actively sought to encourage its individual investors to band together. The older, 
established groups were willing to share their knowledge with the new groups. This helps to 
explain why, as we comment later, most of the groups have similar operating models. The 
visibility of angel groups and publicity for LINC’s activities created a momentum and other 
groups emerged independently of LINC’s efforts. These new groups typically emerged from 
existing groups of investors who were already working together informally and so had a 
‘club’ mentality. However, they were required to find a chairman/gatekeeper, either from 
their own members or, less commonly, externally, in order to start investing. LINC Scotland 
was able to support new angel groups financially on account of its access to ERDF funding.  
 
The second driver was the Scottish Co-Investment Fund (SCIF) which came on stream in 
2003 in response to the acute shortage of risk capital in the aftermath of the dotcom crash. 
The SCIF was designed to invest alongside private sector investment partners on a pari passu 
basis, investing up to £1 for every £1 invested by the partner to a maximum of £1m per 
business (and with the introduction of follow-on funding from the Venture Fund deal sizes 
can be even larger). The intention was to improve liquidity in the market, enabling partners to 
make bigger investments, or follow-on investments, and freeing up part of their funds to 
invest in new businesses rather than follow-on investments. The SCIF carried out due 
diligence on prospective  partners before accepting them onto the scheme. The partners make 
their own investment decisions. SCIF did not undertake its own investment analysis. Their 
only decision was to confirm that the business fell within the rules of the scheme. The 
                                                          
4
 LINC Scotland has enterprise agency status which gives it direct access to apply for ERDF funding  
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eligibility criteria were known to investors. Partners could seek initial approval of a 
prospective investment’s eligibility in principle at an early stage in their appraisal process. 
Once investment terms were agreed by the partner, SCIF approval, or not, was generally 
made within 24 hours of bringing an investment to the Fund. This high level of certainty was 
built into the scheme following consultation with  the initial angel groups and, arguably, has 
been a key feature of its success. Although angel groups accounted for less than half of the 
Fund’s investment partners, the fund’s maximum investment limit meant that the vast 
majority of the deals that qualified were brought by angel groups rather than venture capital 
funds.  
 
The existence of the SCIF encouraged the emergence of syndicates in two respects. First, the 
SCIF wanted to expand its number of investment partners so welcomed the formation of new 
groups, especially in areas of the country where they were lacking. LINC Scotland was 
specifically contracted to support the creation of three new groups per annum to be co-
investment partners. Second, angel groups received a 2.5% fee on completion of every co-
investment deal that they participated in. This provided useful additional income to fund the 
syndicate’s running costs, supporting salaries of a gatekeeper and possibly one or more 
administrative staff. 
 
Investment activity by angel groups has grown steadily since 2002-3, in terms of both 
number and amount invested. There were 81 deals in 2012 compared with just 22 in 2002-3
5
 
(Figure 2). Only part of the recent rise in investments is due to activity of new groups that did 
not exist in 2010 (these groups made 8 investments in 2012). Moreover, investment activity is  
                                                          
5
 LINC changed its reporting period from financial year to calendar year in 2009. 
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Figure 2. Number of investments made by angel groups in Scotland, 2000-2012 (source: 
LINC Scotland) 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Amounts invested by angel groups in Scotland, 2000-2012 (source: LINC Scotland) 
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skewed to a small number of groups, with just two groups making 69% of the investments in 
the period 2009-12. Almost every other group made less than 10 new investments in the 
period (i.e. excluding follow-on investments). The amount invested by members of the angel 
groups has risen from £6.3m in 2002-3 to £22.5m in 2012 after peaking in 2011 (Figure 3). 
Total aggregate investment (i.e. including co-investors) has increased even more sharply, 
from £6.8m in 2002-03 to £30.9m in 2012, having peaked at £34.5m the previous year 
(Figure 4), reflecting both the growth of the SCIF and the increasing tendency for angel 
groups co-invest with one another. This represents a significant part of the risk capital market 
in Scotland (Harrison et al 2010). According to the most recent Scottish Risk Capital report, 
angels accounted for over one quarter of investments by value in the £100,000 to £2m range 
(Table 2), rising to around half if the SCIF investments are also included.    
 
 
Figure 2 - Total aggregate transaction value of angel group investments in Scotland from 
2000 to 2012 (source: LINC Scotland) 
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Table 2 - Venture capital investment in Scotland, 2009-11 (source: Harris and Mason, 
2012) 
 
         Investments £100,000 - £2m Investments of over £2m 
2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 
£m % £m % £m % £m % £m % £m % 
angels 13.2 27.3 15.6  29.6 12.8 27.5 0.7 1.3 0.1 0.2 1.4 3.3 
VCs 11.0 22.7 13.6 25.8 14.4 30.9 41.7 74.6 62.8 86.5 33.8 80.5 
Scottish 
Enterprise/public 
sector 
20.3 41.9 16.8 31.9 14.4 30.9 9.9 17.7 6.4 8.8 2.8 6.7 
other 3.9 8.1 6.7 12.7 5.0 10.7 3.6 6.4 3.3 4.5 4.0 9.5 
 
 
Of course these investments represent only a fraction of the investment opportunities that the 
groups see. The number of opportunities seen by the groups in the previous 12 months ranged  
from under 10 (due to circumstances specific to that group) to over 250. However, the 
majority of groups saw between 40 and 150 investment opportunities (median = 100). No 
doubt some opportunities will be seen by more than one group. The overall ‘yield rate’ – 
investments as a proportion of opportunities seen invested - was about 6.5%.  This is 
significantly lower than the equivalent data reported by Sohl (2012) for US angel groups. 
Assuming that the difference is real, rather due to data or definitional differences, then there 
are several possible explanations for this difference. It may reflect differences in year – the 
latest US figure is for 2009 whereas the Scottish data are for 2012 and there are considerable 
year-on–year variations in the yield rates of US groups. Alternatively, it may reflect the 
poorer quality of opportunities that Scottish groups see, their more exacting screening and 
selection standards, or the superior investment capabilities of US groups (in terms of numbers 
of members and dollars available for investment). 
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Angel groups typically invest anywhere from £25,000 to £500,000 per round, with a few 
outliers at each end. However, as the vast majority (85%) of deals had co-investors – almost 
invariably the SCIF – so deal sizes were larger. Nevertheless, more than 90% of deals in 
2009-10 were below £1m (the maximum allowable transaction under SCIF regulations). 
However, the majority of this investment is follow-on funding. This peaked at over 80% at 
the start of the financial crisis but has fallen back in 2011 and 2012 (Figure 5). Over 60% of 
the companies raising finance in 2009-10 were at the early stage, and around 20% were at the 
seed stage. The majority were in technology sectors. (Mason and Harrison, 2011).  
 
 
Figure 3 – Follow On Vs. First Round Investments (source: LINC Scotland) 
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‘everything’ or ‘everything except X’. There is less diversity in terms of the stage of 
development, with 15 groups looking to invest in early stage or start-up businesses. Two 
groups are even more focused on proof of concept and seed stages. There is also diversity in 
the size of investment. Three groups stated this was ‘unlimited’, two groups would invest up 
to £500,000, and three would go up to £1m. However, the majority of groups are looking to 
invest under £250,000 per deal, not including any coinvestment. Finally, the majority (12) of 
groups are looking to invest in Scotland, although in a few cases this was ‘not exclusive’. 
Four groups reported that they would invest worldwide, confirming that while angel investing 
is a local phenomenon it is not exclusively so (Harrison et al, 2010b) 
 
Three aspects of the investment activity of angel groups stand out. First, and reflecting one of 
the comments by Sohl (2012), follow-on investments have quickly dominated the investment 
activity of angel groups. This may be a ‘natural’ process, reflecting a combination of the 
financial strength of angel groups to make follow-on investments and the lack of alternative 
investors to provide follow-on funding (Harrison et al 2010a). However, some groups have 
turned down the opportunity to bring institutional investors into deals, because of fears of 
both being diluted and also losing control of the investment, particularly the ability to 
influence, manage and control the exit. The need to invest in ordinary shares so that investors 
qualify for tax relief under the Enterprise Investment Scheme is a further discouragement to 
seek follow-on funding from institutional investors.  As discussed earlier, these investors will 
invest using preference shares and other more complex instruments which gives them greater 
power over investors with ordinary shares.  
 
Second, there have been surprisingly few exits (Figure 6). The groups have collectively made 
37 exits which represents just 4% of their investments. The majority of groups - 12 of the 17  
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Figure 6. Investment outcomes (source: interview survey) 
 
that provided data - have not made any exits. To some extent this reflects the young age of 
many of the groups. Indeed, four of the five groups that have achieved exits were formed at  
least eight years ago, with the three longest established groups accounting for 92% of total 
exits.  Nevertheless, it is striking that the vast majority of groups that were founded between 
five and eight years ago have not made any exits. This contrasts with earlier studies of exits 
by UK business angels which reported median holding periods to exit of four years (Mason 
and Harrison, 2002b) and six years (Wiltbank, 2010). This difference reflects the much 
longer time that it is now taking globally to exit. It could therefore be argued that we no 
longer know what represents the ‘norm’ and accordingly we risk interpreting these data with 
unrealistic expectations. 
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However, some commentators argue that the lack of exits also reflects the common view 
amongst angel investors that it is inappropriate to discuss exits with entrepreneurs prior to 
investing or even to actively pursue an exit after the investment is made (Gray, 2011). The 
exit was traditionally never considered or discussed before investing. The prevailing view in 
the angel investment community has been that “if you make good investments the exit will 
take care of itself”. It is claimed that this approach has resulted in investments in companies 
that are not of interest to potential acquirers and so have not been acquired. The outcome is 
that large quantities of angel money – and public money that followed as co-investments – is 
locked up in portfolios. Whether this remains the common approach of angel groups will be 
the subject of a future paper.  
 
The lack of exits has three knock-on effects. First, it contributes to the high proportion of 
follow-on investments noted earlier. Second, it limits the amount of capital gains that can be 
recycled into new investments, a primary target of national government policy to increase 
angel investment levels. Investors also get discouraged having to invest more money into 
existing businesses and not seeing returns from their previous investments. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that in some cases this has prompted angels to cease investing. Third, there 
comes a point when the lack of exits has a negative influence on the ability of groups to 
recruit new angels, or even for new groups to get started.  
 
Third, and equally surprising, is the low number of failed investments (see Figure 6). These 
account for 17% of total investments. The three oldest groups account for 82% of all losses. 
Previous studies have reported that the median failed investment emerges after two or three 
years (Mason and Harrison 2002b; Wiltbank, 2010).  In view of the recessionary conditions 
that have prevailed since 2008 it would be surprising if general business failure rates have 
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been lower in recent years, so this might suggest that angel groups are managing their 
unsuccessful investments badly. This is largely confirmed in our survey, with two-thirds of 
the groups reporting that they had no formal strategy for dealing with the ‘living dead’ in 
their portfolios. This creates the risk that these investments absorb time and further funding. 
However, the groups that do have a strategy for these types of investments tend not to adopt a 
‘fast failures’ strategy that is advocated as best practice (Mason and Harrison, 2012). On the 
other hand, the ability of investors to pursue a fast fail strategy is limited by several factors, 
notably their minority shareholding position and, perhaps, by the attitude of the co-
investment fund. It is unknown whether the SCIF would favour selling investments in ‘living 
dead’ businesses back to the management for a nominal figure  
 
ANGEL GROUP INVESTMENT PROCESSES 
The investment process of angel groups is rather different to that of individual angels. 
Previous research has established that individual angels undertake an initial screening process 
to establish whether the proposal is a good fit with their investment criteria and would appear 
to have merit. This is typically a fast process, taking anything from one to twenty minutes 
(Mason and Rogers, 1997; Harrison et al, 1997), and upwards of 90% of proposals get 
rejected at this stage (Feeney et al, 1999). Those proposals that get through the initial 
screening are then investigated in detail. 
 
The investment process of angel groups is rather more extended and involves more stages. 
Two distinct approaches are apparent amongst the Scottish groups, although there are 
differences of detail in each approach. In both cases the gatekeeper is the initial point of 
contact for the business. The gatekeeper then undertakes the initial screening role. At its most 
basic this may simply be to filter businesses against the group’s key investment criteria. In 
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other cases it is more proactive with gatekeeper assessing the business plan and in some cases 
contacting the entrepreneur to gather information about the company. In some groups the 
gatekeeper may be assisted by one of the members, perhaps to bring in sector expertise.  
 
The differences in approach occur at the next stage. In some groups the businesses that get 
through the filtering and initial screening processes are evaluated in detail by a small group of 
the angels. This may include a presentation by the entrepreneur to this inner core. They will 
make a collective decision whether or not to invest in the business themselves. If this inner 
core decide unanimously to invest then the opportunity is opened up to the rest of the group 
for each member to decide individually whether they also want to invest. This approach is  
typified by Archangels (Gregson et al, 2013).  In the alternative approach those businesses 
that get past the screening stage are presented to the group members. Typically the company 
will make a presentation. Some groups will coach the entrepreneurs prior to the presentation. 
Each individual member then makes their own decision whether or not they are interested in 
investing. If there is sufficient interest then a sub-group is established to do the due diligence 
and, if appropriate, negotiate the terms and conditions of the investment. The deal will then 
be brought back to the members to make individual decisions whether or not to invest. 
 
The key difference between these two approaches is therefore who drives the process after 
the initial screening stage. In the first approach it is driven by an active core group of angels, 
with the outer core only being invited to invest, on a take-it or leave-it basis, in those deals 
that the core group have decided to invest in. In the second approach the members drive the 
process, with the gatekeeper undertaking due diligence on those businesses that the 
membership are interested in.  
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Compared with individual angels (Mason and Harrison, 1996b), raising finance from angel 
groups is more costly for the entrepreneur. None of the Scottish groups require entrepreneurs 
to ‘pay to pitch’; however, four groups charge fees associated with the due diligence process 
and the majority of groups charge deal/completion fees when the investment is made 
(typically 3% of the amount raised) (10 groups) and also levy ongoing non-executive director 
monitoring fees (11 groups).  
 
This investment process has a number of implications for entrepreneurs seeking finance from 
angel groups.  First, there are more people involved in the process and hence more people 
have to be persuaded of the merits of the investment opportunity. Second, gatekeepers have 
the power to reject investment opportunities but it is the members who make the decision to 
invest. The entrepreneur has therefore to get past the gatekeeper in order to reach potential 
investors. Third, in contrast to traditional business angel networks where the pitch to an 
audience of potential investors is at the start of the process and is used by the investors as the 
initial screening process, with angel groups the pitching stage occurs later in the process after 
the business has passed the initial screen. This, in turn, has implications for the content and 
style of the pitch. Fourth, raising finance from angel groups incurs fees whereas this would 
not typically be the case with individual angels. However, business angel networks also 
change fees. Finally, given the various stages and different people involved, the length of 
time to secure an investment from an angel group will generally be longer than in the case of 
individual angels. 
 
THE GATEKEEPER 
The previous discussion has highlighted the critical role of the group gatekeeper in the 
investment process, managing both the day-to-day operations of the group and, more 
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significantly, controlling access to investors. The emergence of this new actor is one of the 
most significant outcomes of the growth of angel groups, with considerable implications both 
for scholars who continue to focus on how individual angels make their investment decisions 
and also for entrepreneurs. Gatekeepers are of two types: member gatekeepers and manager 
gatekeepers (Paul and Whittam, 2010). Gatekeepers have typically emerged from within the 
group that initially started the angel group. However, the bigger groups, such as Braveheart 
and Archangels, have appointed external managers as they became larger. Some groups have 
gone further, hiving off a separate administrator function from the gatekeeper’s role. Indeed, 
in 11 of the 18 groups (61%) the role of gatekeeper is shared.  In contrast, building an angel 
group around a gatekeeper has not proved to be a successful approach. In half of the groups 
(9) that were interviewed, members act as managers (more than half of whom receive 
remuneration), five groups (28%) have hired an external manager and in the remaining four 
groups the gatekeeper role is shared between a member and someone that has been hired. The 
implication is that the gatekeeper function changes as the group’s activities increase and 
portfolio management becomes a more time consuming and critical function. 
 
The gatekeeper undertakes a variety of functions (Table 3). Two-thirds of gatekeepers 
undertake external-facing roles, notably the promotion of the group to attract new investors 
and entrepreneurs. Around half also report that they undertake internal roles, mostly 
interacting and communicating with the members. However, their main functions are 
associated with managing the investment process. Gatekeepers review the business plans and 
executive summaries that they receive from entrepreneurs seeking finance, decide whether it 
meets the investment criteria of the group, may seek additional information and even meet 
the entrepreneur and ultimately make the decision whether the opportunity is passed on to the 
group members, whether an inner core or the entire group, to be considered for investment. 
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The gatekeeper may also be responsible for preparing one or more supporting papers on the 
business for the group. The gatekeeper will also follow up with members to gauge their 
interest in the opportunity. In the second model, discussed in the previous section, if the 
group is interested in the business then the gatekeeper will also be involved in the due 
diligence process and even in the negotiation. It is of note that fewer than half of the 
gatekeepers are involved in the process after the investment is made. Specifically, few 
gatekeepers see the preparation of investee companies for an exit being as being part of their 
role.  
 
Table 3. Gatekeeper Roles 
General function Proportion of 
gatekeepers 
citing this role 
Detailed function Proportion of 
gatekeepers 
citing this 
role 
 
1. External 66.7 Marketing 
Promotion 
Recruitment 
 
31.8 
40.9 
18.2 
2. Internal 52.4 Interaction with members 
Organisation of the process 
Internal communication 
Administrative 
 
9.1 
9.1 
45.4 
45.4 
3. Investment Process 100.0 Sourcing 
Screening 
Due diligence 
Negotiation 
Post-investment 
Exiting 
Others 
 
45.4 
100.0 
63.4 
40.9 
45.4 
18.2 
54.5 
4. Organisational 19.0 Creation of group 
Development of group 
0.1 
0.1 
 
Source: compiled from interviews 
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The norm is for a member of the group to take on the role of non-executive director in the 
investee company. It is only in the larger groups, which have more support staff, that the 
gatekeeper is involved in portfolio management. The majority (17 out of 21, or 81%) 
undertake this function on a part-time basis (less 30 hours a week). 
 
Table 4 – Skills required for gatekeeper role 
                        % 
Communication Skills 59.1 
Evaluating 54.5 
Management 54.5 
Networking  9.1 
Leadership 4.5 
Passion 9.1 
Patience 13.6 
Curiosity 13.6 
Negotiation 9.1 
Broader Business Knowledge 36.4 
Specific Business Knowledge 22.7 
Investment Experience 31.8 
SME Experience 13.6 
 
Source: compiled from interviews 
 
The backgrounds of the gatekeepers are remarkably varied. There is considerable variety in 
academic expertise, albeit with a bias to accounting, finance and law. Just under half reported 
work experience in banking, accountancy or corporate finance. Eleven (52%) had 
entrepreneurial experience although 15 (71%) have personal experience of making angel 
investments, reflecting the presence of a number of member angels as gatekeepers. The vast 
majority thought they were prepared for the role (95%), even though those in the longer 
established groups were actually pioneers, defining and shaping the role. Collectively, 
respondents identified a wide variety of skills that were necessary for the role (Table 4). 
Those most frequently mentioned were communication skills, people-management skills, and 
financial skills. Both broader business-related experience and specific business know-how 
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were also seen by a significant minority of angels as being necessary. The majority of 
gatekeepers (59%) believed that they had these skills when the assumed this role. The 
remainder indicated that the role was a constant learning experience.  
 
The main areas where, with the benefit of hindsight, angels recognised their knowledge to be 
deficient were in terms of the operation of angel syndicates and deal structures. This is 
perhaps not surprising in view of the differences between the role of the gatekeeper and that 
of an individual angel. Key areas of learning were syndication, deal terms and people – 
managing them, communicating with them and accessing them.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Angel investing is changing from an invisible and largely individual process to one in which 
angels are joining together in organised and managed groups to invest. This is evident in the 
USA and Canada, Western Europe and Australia and New Zealand, although the pace of 
change has varied between countries. Yet despite the growing significance of the angel 
market as a key source of finance for entrepreneurial companies at the start of the so-called 
funding escalator little scholarly attention has been devoted to this development, despite the 
possibility that it renders much of the existing research base redundant. Nor has there been 
much consideration of the practical consequences of this change either for entrepreneurs and 
investors nor the policy implications. This paper is the first attempt to provide an in-depth 
examination of the growth of angel groups and the implications for the financing of 
entrepreneurial ventures.  
 
The paper draws on evidence from Scotland where, for a variety of reasons, the emergence of 
angel groups has proceeded further than anywhere else outside of the USA. Indeed, 
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Scotland’s population of angel groups is larger than that of the majority of US states. There 
are currently around 20 angel groups in Scotland compared with just two prior to 2000. They 
account for more than one-quarter of all investment activity by value in the £100,000 to £2m 
range, and more than half if the pull through of investment from the Scottish Co-Investment 
Fund is also considered. However, activity is skewed to a minority of larger and longer-
established groups. 
 
The existing debate about the implications of the growth of angel groups mainly focuses on 
the benefits, notably their greater visibility and greater professionalism compared with 
individual angels which, it is argued, reduces the time and cost for the entrepreneur of raising 
finance. In addition it is thought to have expanded the supply of informal venture capital by 
attracting passive investors who lack the capabilities to invest on their own. However, others 
have raised the concern that the essence of angel investing is at risk of being lost as the 
process becomes more organised. Some have also expressed the concern that the angel 
market could evolve in the same way as venture capital funds, shifting to making larger and 
later stage investments and losing its ability to add value. 
 
Our evidence is finely balanced. On the supply side the process has reduced the number of 
investment decision-makers in the market as individual angels have joined angel groups. It 
has probably also reduced the number of investments of £50,000 and below which are too 
small for groups to make. However, crowdfunding may fill this gap. Groups have focused on 
making larger investments and follow-on investments, with the latter trend in particular 
constraining the number of new investments. Nevertheless, the creation of new syndicates 
continues to mobilise new capital into the market. On the other hand, the greater investment 
capability of angel groups has filled the funding gap created by the decline of venture capital 
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funds specialising in seed, start-up and early stage financing. From a process point of view 
angel groups extend the investment process, adding more stages and increasing the decision-
time, and the gatekeeper now controls access to the angels. Moreover, market deficiencies 
remain. The emergence of angel groups, with government support, has helped resolve the 
‘traditional’ equity gap (originally under £250,000 but other definitions have put this figure 
closer to £1m). However it has opened up a ‘second’ equity gap (Murray, 1994; Sohl, 2012) 
above £1m-£2m for growth capital, beyond the capability of virtually all angel groups, even 
with syndication. This is a challenge for angel-backed companies requiring growth capital to 
fulfil their potential and may result in their premature sale to overseas companies to the 
possible detriment of both investors and the regional economy. 
 
Moreover, Scotland’s angel market may be out of equilibrium. First, the availability of ERDF 
funding may have resulted in too many angel groups being created for the available 
investment opportunities. Second, it may have resulted in too many manager-led groups and 
limited involvement of individual members in contrast to the USA where there appears to be 
greater member involvement. Third, some of the angel groups may not be financially 
sustainable, certainly without the public sector support they receive. The groups most at risk 
are those that have expensive manager-gatekeeper functions and a process that is not 
sufficiently ruthless at the initial screening stage, combined with the lack sufficient volume of 
investment activity to generate fee income. However, this situation has arisen because LINC 
has followed a strategy of increasing investment channels to provide increased choice for 
businesses seeking finance. Moreover, if there is an inevitability that established groups focus 
on follow-on investments as they mature then there is an ongoing need to create new groups 
to make new investments. But new groups take time to reach critical mass, and some may 
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never become fully viable. The alternative outcome might have been fewer, larger groups 
which would also have been seen as detrimental for economic development. 
 
A further concern is that some groups appear to be evolving, not to become venture capital 
funds, as Sohl (2007; 2012) feared, but fund managers. This is most clearly seen in the case 
of Braveheart, now listed on AIM, which describes itself as follows:  
Braveheart has around £120m of funds under management and provides equity, loan 
and mezzanine funding to Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs). It also provides 
SMEs with advisory services, particularly in the areas of corporate finance and 
investment readiness. Funding is provided by way of various regional/national funds 
and by investment syndicates which the Group establishes and facilitates. Braveheart 
also serves the investment appetites of high net worth individuals (HNWs), family 
offices, institutional investors and public sector organisations spanning the UK and 
Europe. 
At least one other group appears to be moving in a similar direction.  
 
Finally, what has been the economic impact of Scotland’s much admired business angel 
market?  The support that the angel market has received from the public sector both through 
ERDF funding and indirectly via the Enterprise Investment Scheme means that this question 
cannot be ignored, although it could be argued to be premature. Moreover, there is a risk in 
answering the question that it is based on inappropriate yardsticks. Arguably, we lack 
sufficient evidence to make a judgement on what represents “success”. Taking the ‘glass half 
empty’ viewpoint, a strong case can be made that the impact has been disappointing. 
Investors have achieved relatively few exits and most of these have been small, with the 
consequence that little wealth has been created for recycling in new ventures, and 
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management learning in a growth company context has been truncated. The other side of this 
coin is that it has not led to the creation of ‘companies of scale’, a key focus of Scottish 
Enterprise policy over the past decade (Brown and Mason, 2012). The riposte to these 
criticisms is twofold. First, acquisitions data shows that the market is dominated by small 
exits, typically £25m to £50m, which give a good return to investors but are small enough 
that the cashed-out entrepreneurs need to become serial entrepreneurs.  Second, it is not the 
role of angels to build ‘companies of scale’ (although they have been responsible for a 
handful in the past, e.g. Optos). Moreover, these companies are likely to require significant 
amounts of finance and therefore carry a significant dilution risk for angels and also 
appropriate management. 
 
A glass ‘half full’ perspective would argue that Scotland has stumbled upon an effective 
model of angel investing that overcomes the limitations of its angel market imposed by its 
historic low level of entrepreneurial activity (Paul et al 2003). This model makes efficient use 
of its limited number of active angels to serve as nodes to cluster less knowledgeable money 
of high income individuals typically in the professions and who are looking for tax efficient 
investments. In the absence of such groups it is quite possible that this money will have been 
invested with the traditional fund managers who will not have channelled it either to 
entrepreneurial businesses or in Scotland. 
 
So, what are the wider implications beyond Scotland for countries looking to stimulate their 
own angel markets? First, choices need to be made, notably between support for BANs and 
support for angel groups. Both models result in entrepreneurs receiving funding from angel 
investors.  To outsiders, the models may seem quite similar but, to angels and entrepreneurs, 
the two models are quite different. From a public policy perspective, the evidence on the 
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relative effectiveness of these models is not clear-cut.  Second, context matters. LINC 
Scotland’s access to ERDF was critical in terms of the number and diversity of angel groups 
that have been created, and the dominance of manager-led models. The co-investment fund, 
which has been successfully replicated elsewhere (New Zealand, Canada), has also been 
critical. Third, there are different models to that developed in Scotland. For example, Halo in 
Northern Ireland (http://www.nisp.co.uk/halo/about/) has developed a model in which they 
act as the first selection gate for angel groups, inviting them to large pitching events, while 
other groups that are not members of Halo will form an outer ‘ring’ to ‘bulk up’ the 
investments led by the groups. Fourth, policy-makers cannot simply intervene in one part of 
the market. Supporting the angel market has largely addressed the conventional equity gap 
but with more early stage companies being funded, combined with the decline in venture 
capital funds, this can created an unsatisfied demand for growth funding in amounts in excess 
of £1m, the so-called “Series A crunch”. Finally, it is uncertain how crowdfunding will affect 
the angel market. 
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